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ATTORNEY.
Misconduct.-Where in the settlement of a suit pending in
court, the plaintiffs attorney charged for cost more than could be
legally taxed against a defendant, but not more than might be
regarded as reasonable as against the plaintiff, and the attorney
withhold the items from the defendant who pays the amount, and
then obtains a bill charged to the plaintiff, the court will not in-
terfere by summary proceedings, unless it is made to appear that
the attorney fraudulently led the defendant to believe that he was
bound to pay that bill: Barker's case, 48 or 49 N. H.
That, although the mere withholding from the defendant the
items of charge, when requested to exhibit them, would not or-
dinarily be proof of a fraudulent representation, yet it must be re-
garded as inconsistent with that frankness that ought to distinguish
the profession, and as calculated to bring into disrepute, and to
lead to a suspicion that there was a purpose to mislead: Id.
BETTING.-See Gaming.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Assignment of Note in the Eands of the Payee.-Whatever
assignment the payee of a note may make upon the same, he does
aot by such assignment pass the legal title to his assignee, while
it still remains in the hands of the payee or assignor: Bichards
v. Darst, 51 Ills.
While the note so remains in the hands of the payee, it is under
his control, and he may bring an action upon it in his own name,
and be may erase or otherwise render the assignment inoperative:
Id.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
Description of Property Mortgaged must Control.-A mortga-
gee of personal property must see to it thatthe property mortgaged
is correctly and truly described, so that others may not be mis-
led. The description given in the mortgage must control, other-
wise great fraud and injury might result: Hutton'v. Arnett, 51 Ills.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-See Corporation.
Eminent Domain- Taking Private Property for Public Use--
Of the Compensation Therefor.-Where thb land of an individual
1 From Hon. X. L. Freeman. Reporter, to appear in .51 Ills. Reports.
"From the Judges of the Court, to appear in 44 or 4') IN. II. Reports.
3 From lion. 0. L. Barbour, Report, to appear in voL 57 of his Report&
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is condemned for public use, as for a public park in a city, and the
damages assessed therefor, until the damages are paid the land
cannot be occupied for the purpose for which it was condemned;
but it has been held such damages may be paid by the benefits
conferred upon the owner by the contemplated improvement: Peo-
pie ex rel. South Park Commissioners v. Williams, 51 Ills.
The Act of February 25, 1869, in reference to the South Park,
in the city of Chicago, confers the power to condemn land for the
purposes of the park, and, as soon as the park commissioners shall
ascertain, with reasonable certainty, the amount required for the
condemnation of the grounds selected for the park, it is made the
duty of the Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook county to appoint
assessors to assess the amount so ascertained, upon property sub.
ject thereto, in proportion to the benefits resulting to such pro-
perty, and this duty of the circuit judge to appoint the assessorg
arises whenever the commissioners shall determine what amount,
in their judgment, will be required, and shall apply to the judge
to make the appointment: Id.
The act prescribes no particular mode in which the commission-
ers shall ascertain the amount required; they are sworn officers,
and there is no guide in that respect but their own judgments.
Nor is it necessary the precise amount should be ascertained, but
an approximation only: 1,.
The act provides the means of making compensation to owners
of land condemned, by adopting the mode prescribed in the Act of
June 22, 1852, in relation to condemning the right of way for the
purpose of internal improvement, by which ample provision is
made for the payment of the condemnation money: Id.
CORPORATION.
Private Corporation- What Constitutes.-" The St. Clair and
Monroe Levee and Drainage Company," incorporated by the Act
of February 16, 1865, for the purpose of leveeing and draining a
certain district therein named, is under the exclusive control of the
corporators themselves, and vacancies occurring among them to
be filled at the discretion of the survivers ; the Act was never sub-
mitted to a vote of the people to be affected by it, but the sole
charter of the authority- thereby conferred is the Act itself. Al-
though the object of the corporation, when accomplished, would
be a public benefit, yet the corporation itself, in its composition
and management, is strictly private: Harward v. St. Clair & Mon-
roe Levee and Drainage Co., 51 Ills.
Taxation for "Corporate Purposes"-Upon Whom the Power
may be Conferred- Constitutional Limitations.-The 5th section of
the 9th article of our Constitution, which provides that "the corpo-
rate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns,
and villages, may be vested with power to asses and collect taxes
for corporate purposes," not only limits local or corporate taxation
to local or corporate purposes, but was also intended as a limitation
upon the power of the legislature to grant the right of corporate or
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local taxation to any other persons than the corporate or local au-
thorities of t6e municipality or district to be taxed: Id.
Under our (Vonstitution, the right of taxation cannot be granted
either to private persons or private corporations: Id.
So much of the act incorporating "The St. Clair and Monroe
Levee and Drainage Company," as undertakes to confer upon that
company the power to levy a tax upon property within the desig-
nated district, to carry out the object of its incorporation, is in
violation of the Constitution, the members of the company not
being "corporate authorities" of the district to be affected by their
action, the corporation being merely a private corporation: Id.
By the phrase "corporate authorities," as used in the Constitution,
must be understood those municipal officers who are either directly
elected by the population sought to be taxed by them, or appoint-
ed in some mode to which they have given their assent: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Fraudulent Assignment.-Where debtors, immediately before-
making an assignment for the benefit of creditors, bought merchan-
dis'e which they did not intend to pay for, but which they sold on
credit, and assigned the debt owing for the price to the assignee ;
and at the time of making the assignment, retained a large amount
of money from the assignee, for their own use, and allowed moneys
to be retained by clerks, fraudulently, either for their own use or
for the benefit of the assignors: Held, that these facts, unexplained
by the debtors, were amply sufficient to warrant a finding that the
assignors were actuated by a fraudulent intent in making the as-
signment, and that it was the duty -of the court below to have so
found: Waverly National Bank v. Halsey, 57 Barb.
DEED.-See Easement.
DowER.-See Husband and Wife.
EASEMENT.
Beservation by Grantor-Estoppel -Where plaintiff by deed
conveyed to the grantee a certain well and aqueduct leading
therefrom, excepting a certain branch before conveyed, and the
plaintiff's right of using all necessary water at certain places de-
scribed, it was held that the rights so excepted always remained
in the grantor, and would enure to the benefit of his heirs and as-
signs, although there were no words of limitation: Emerson v.
Mooney, 48 or 49 N. H.
When in such deed it was stipulated that the grantee should
guaranty to the grantor a sufficient quantity of water at the places
described, and the deed was accepted by the grantee, it was held
that he and his assigns were estopped to deny the grantee's title,
although the instrument was a deed poll and not signed by the
grantee : Id.
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ESCAPE.
A person committed to jail on final process is to be kept in con-
finement in the jail until he performs what he is ordered to do, or
is discharged in due course of law: Riley v. Wittiker, 48 or 49
N.H.
B, after a trial under the Bastardy Act, was ordered by the court
to give a bond, etc., to the town of P. to save said town harmless,
etc., and pay costs of prosecution, etc., and to stand committed
until this order was performed; and not furnishing the bond, was
committed to jail, and the defendants, citizens of said town, gave a
bond to the jailer on behalf of the town, to pay the prison charges
of said B. The jailer allowed said B to go outside of the rooms
used as the jail, and take his meals in another part of the same
building, with the jailer's family, and also to go outside of said
building: Held, that these indulgences constituted a voluntary
escape, and that after such escape, the jailer could not recover his
prison charges of said town nor of these defendants: Id.
EsToPPE.L-See Easement.
EVIDENCE.
Judicial Notice as to who are the Officers of a Court.-The Cir-
cuit Courts in this State will take judicial notice of who are their
officers, as, for instance, the clerk: Dyer v. Last, 51 Ills.
So, where the jurat attached to an affidavit of non-residence was
signed in the name of a person, by another, as deputy, without
any designation of the official charahter of the principal or of the
deputy, the court inwhich the proceeding is pending may take
judicial notice that the person whose name was signed to the
jurat was the clerk of that court: Id.
And upon such case being brought to the appellate court, it ap-
pearing from the record that the same person whose name was
signed to the jurat, without any official designation, had issued
the summons in the case as clerk, and had also signed the notice
of publication in the same capacity, this court, upon an objection
being made that thejurat to the affidavit was not signed by an
officer, will presume that the court below took judicial notice of
the official character of such person: Id.
This case differs from the case of McDermaid v. Bussell, 41 Ills.
489, in the fact, that the record discloses that the affidavit was
sworn to before an officer of the court. In that case, so far as the
record disclosed,the affidavit was not sworn to before any officer: Id.
Of Vendor as to Title of Vendee.-The statements and declara-
tions of a vendor in reference to ownership of the property sold,
made before the sale, are admissible on an issue of ownership, where
the vendee is a party; such declarations bind parties and privies,
and the vendee is a privy: Bandegger v. Ehrhardt et al., 51 Ills.
But declarations of the vendor in reference to the ownership of
the property, made after the sale, are not admissible in evidence to
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defeat the title of his vendee, unless the vendee is present at the
time such declarations are made, and either expressly or tacitly
assents to their truth: Id.
GAmnG.
Services for Training a Horse for a lBace.-Where a party
brought his action to recover for services rendered in fitting a
horse for a race, on which money was bet, it was held, that the
services rendered, whether the race was run or not, being in aid
of an offense prohibited by statute, were in violation of law, and
he could not recover: Mosher v. Griffin, 51 Ills.
But, for money laid out and expended for the shoeing and feed
of the horse, while under training, it not necessarily being a part
of a gaming transaction, he was entitled to recover: Id.
Beting.-Gambling, being against public morals, is declared a
crime ; while a bet or wager, being against public policy, is void:
Johnson v. Ferris, 48 or 49 N. H.
The legislature intended to discourage and discountenance bet-
ting as improper, though the act is not made criminal: Id.
Money paid to hire or procure another to make a bet or wager
cannot be recovered back: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFR
Joint Liability for Libel -At common law, an action lay
against husband and wife jointly, for a libel written and published
by the wife alone ; and a general judgment could be rendered
against them both, if the charge were established. This rule has
not been changed by statute in New York: Tait v. Culbertson
and Wife, 57 Barb.
Marriage under Duress.-A marriage brouglit about by fraud
or force or fear, so as to be void ab initio without ratification, may
be ratified by the injured and innocent party after the fraud is
known, and the duress or cause of fear is removed, and the mar-
riage thereby rendered valid: Hampstead v. Plaistow, 48 or 49
N.H.
A voluntary cohabitation after full knowledge of the fraud, and
after the force or cause of fear is removed, will cure the defect: Id.
Whether the fraud or duress of third persons, not participated in
by either of the parties, will avoid a marriage, quzre? Id.
Dower- What Considered a Valid Belinquishment of.-On
the 26th of January, 1853, J, a resident of the State of Ohio, exe-
cuted, in that State, a deed conveying certain lands in this State
to I. J's wife signed the deed with her husband, and duly
acknowledged the same before a proper officer. The certificate was
in proper form, in all respects conforming to the requirements of
the statute, but the body of the deed did not describe her as a
grantor, nor name her or her dower in any mode whatever: Held,
in a suit by J's widow, to obtain dower in the premises so con-
veyed, that this deed amounted to a complete and valid relin-
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quishment of her dower, under the Act of 1845, and that inde-
pendently of the Act of 1847 : Johnson v. Montgomery, 51 Ills.
It is said that the law favors dower; but it is not to be under-
stood, by such remark, that the law favors a claim of dower which
claimant has once sought, in good faith, and for a valuable con-
sideration, to relinquish, and has done whatever at the time was
deemed necessary to make such relinquishment complete: 7d.
Under our statute it is not necessary that the wife, joining her
husband in a conveyance of his property, should use apt words of
grant in her own name, and apply them in the body of the deed,
for the purpose of relinquishing her dower: Id.
In order to make a complete and valid relinquishment of dower,
the statute only requires that the wife shall sign the deed with her
husband, and properly acknowledge it. She must undergo the
separate examination which the law requires, of which fact the
officer before whom such examinationis had must properly cer-
tify: Id
The question as to the mode in which a deed must be executed
in order to bar dower is purely a matter of local law, resting on
the construction of our own statutes, upon which the decisions bf
courts in other States can have little weight: Id.
A married woman, by signing her husband's deed, "joins" in,
it; and, if she is properly examined before an officer, and causes
his certificate of that fact to be placed upon the deed, her dower
in the premises is barred, notwithstanding her name nowhere ap-
pears in the body of the deed: Id.
JUDGMENT.
Lien-Its Territorial Extent.-The lien of a judgment upon real
estate is only co-extensive with the limits of the county in which
it is rendered: Kinney v. Enoebel, 51 Ills.
So, where the State recovered a judgment against a party, in
the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, the lien of the judgment
attached only to the lands of the defendant in that county: Id.
Setting Aside for Irregularity.-For defects or irregularities
not affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and where no fraud or
collusion is imputed, the remedy is given to the party alone; and
another judgment-creditor is.not entitled to have such proceedings
or judgment set aside: Gere v. Gundlach, 57 Barb.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.
Liability for Official Acts.-Where a justice of the peace, after
rendering a judgment for the plaintiff, by mistake entered the same
in his docket as a judgment in favor of the defendant, and a trans-
cript of such judgment being filed and docketed in the county
clerk's office, the plaintiff was compelled to pay the judgment:
Held, that an action could be maintained by the latter against the
Justice, as for an act of ministerial negligence and carelessness by
which the plaintiff had been directly injured: Christopher v. Van
Liew, 57 Barb.
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Such a ease does not fall within the rule ofjudicial impunity for
acts done by a judicial officer in the trial of causes and rendition of
judgments, it being settled that the act of entering the judgment in
the docket by a justice is a ministerial act, and is no part of the
judicial function of rendering the judgment: Id.
Where a justice swore that, from the evidence before him in a
case, he "found his judgment against the defendant and in favor
of the plaintiff, for the sum of, etc, but upon entering said judg
ment in his docket, he by mistake inserted the name of the de-
fendant in the place of that of the plaintiff:" Held, that this was
to be understood as an averrment that the justice had reduced his
judgment to form by his official act, and then made the misiake
in entering the judgment so formed upon his docket, and that the
error was ministerial, and Held, also, that the justice had the right
to correct such a mistake in his docket the moment he' discovered
it, the error being merely clerical: Id.
Liability upon his Promise.-A promise by a justice of the
peace, who has, by his own negligence and carelessness, entered
an erroneous judgment upon his docket in favor of the defendant
instead of the plaintiff, that if the latter will make a motion in the
county court to set aside the erroneous judgment, or the execution
issued thereon, he will pay all the damages growing out of his
mistake, in case the execution shall not be set aside, is not against
public policy, and action will lie upon it: Id.
LIBEL-See Husband and Wife.
MANDAMUS.
Whether it will be awarded Pending another Proceeding in-
volving the same Question.-It has been held, that where parties
have commenced proceedings other than by mandamus, to obtain
the adjudication of a question, the court will not, except in extra-
ordinary cases, interfere by mandamus. But as the granting of a
mandamus is a matter of discretion, the pendency of another pro-
ceeding will not prevent its being awarded, if it seems to the court
to be proper to do so: People ex rel. v. Salomon, 51 Ills.
So, upon the application of the commissioners of the South Park,
in Chicago, for a mandamus to compel the county clerk of Cook
county to receive and file an estimate made by the commissioners
of the amount of money required for park purposes, and to place
that amount in the proper tax warrants to be collected from the
tax-payers of the district, as provided in an act of the legislature on
that subject, it was held, the writ of mandamus ought to be
awarded, notwithstanding the pendency of a suit in chancery, by
which the county clerk and the commissioners were sought to be
enjoined, at the instance of a property owner interested, from doing
the same act which it was sought by the writ of mandamus to have
done. The chancery suit would be final only as between the im-
mediate parties to it, and a decree would not bar a suit of the same
nature by each property owner, and thus the commissioners might
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be delayed indefinitely in the performance of their duties, so it was
considered that more complete justice could be done by means of
the writ of mandamus, and it was awarded: Id.
MARaIAGE.-See Husband and Wife.
MECHANIC'S LIEN.
Is a Proceeding in Chancery and Governed by its Bules.-A
proceeding by petition, to enforce a mechanic's lien, is a chancery
proceeding, and governed by the rules of chancery practice: and
when the petition waives the sworn answer, although the answer
be sworn to, it cannot be received in evidence, and has no other
or greater weight than an answer not sworn to: Clarke et al. v.
Boyle, 51 Ills.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Power to Compel them to Incur Debts against their Will.-The
legislature has no power to compel a city to incur a debt against its
will, and although the city, by its charter, may have power to estab-
lish and maintain a park, and the authorities of the city have power
to issue bonds' for that purpose, yet the legislature cannot compel
them to do so. Nor does the fact that the city authorities have
voluntarily incurred a debt or appropriated money for one park,
give the legislature power to compel them to incur a debt or ap-
propriate money for another park: People ex rel. South Park
Commissioners v. Common Council of Chicago, 51 Ills.
So that act, by which it was sought to compel the city of Chi-
cago, without the consent of the people thereof, or of its corporate
authorities, to issue the bonds of the city for the purpose of equal-
izing the amount which the city had voluntarily expended, and
was about to expend, for Lincoln Park, with that which the act
required the city to appropriate for certain other parks, is invalid
and cannot be enforced: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Action between Partners.-When one partner becomes liable to
his copartner, in an action at law, for the portion of partnership
funds in his hands belonging to such copartner, the form of such
action is properly for money had and received by the defendant to
the use of the plaintiff: Bainsford v. Rainsford, 57 Barb.
The cases in New York are quite uniform in holding that there
must be not only a settlement, but an express promise to pay, be-
fore an action at law, by one partner to recover his share of the
partnership moneys against another partner, can be maint ned: Id.
TAXATION.-See Corporation.
Eminent Domain.-The doctrine of eminent domain is strictly
applicable only to the condemnation of property, and not to the levy
and collection of a tax: Harward v. St Clair Drain. Co., 51 Ills
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Where the legislature incorporated a company whose object was
to levee and drain a certain district of overflowed lands, the attempt
to give to such a corporation, which was a mere private corporation,
the power to levy a tax upon the lands deemed by the corporators
to be benefited by the proposed improvement, could not properly be
referred to the doctrine of eminent domain, because the just com-
pensation required to be made, in the exercise of that right, must
be determined by some impartial agency, and not by those inter-
ested thereby in replenishing their own treasury. That would be
merely the taking of the property of one man to give it to another.
Where a tax is sought to be levied without authority, several
property'owners, having a common interest in the subject, and ask-
ing relief against *the same injury, on the same ground, may join
in a bill to enjoin its collection.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
Notice of a Vendor's Lien upon Real Estate.-L conveyed by deed
to W certain real estate, taking W's note for the purchase money.
Soon after, W executed a mortgage on the premises to his brother
A, to secure the sum of $10,000, and afterward satisfaction was
entered on the mortgage, and an absolute conveyance of the premises
made by W to A. Subsequently, L recovered judgment on the
note against W: Held, in a suit brought by L against W and A,
to enforce his lien as vendor, that A had sufficient notice of L's
lien, it appearing from the evidence, that A, prior to his purchase
from W, was fully informed by L of the conveyance to W, of the
consideration therefor, and the terms of payment, and that no
security had been taken: Wilson v. Lyon, 51 Ills.
And in this case it cannot be said that I, by taking an assign-
ment of a policy of insurance on the life of W, after his convey-
ance to A, thereby waived his lien, as the proof clearly shows that
L did not take such policy as independent security: .d.
And this lien attaches against the vendee, and all persons claim-
ing as volunteers, or with notice under him. Arid if it is even
doubtful whether other and independent security has been taken,
the lien of the vendor still attaches: Id.
So viglldnt are courts of equity to protect a vendor of real
estate, that, although an absolute conveyance is made, and no
mortgage or other security taken, still, in the hands of the vendee,
or a subsequent purchaser with notice, the vendor has a lien on the
land for his money: Dyer v. Mtartin, 4 Scam 147: Id.
Sale of Growing Trees-Statute of Frauds.-A sale of growing
trees, with a right at a future time, whether fixed or indefinite, to
enter upon the land and remove them, conveys an interest in the
land within the statute of frauds, and must be in writing: Howe
v. Batcheler, 48 or 49 N. II.
Where the sale is of the trees simply, without fixing any time
for their removal, the law will imply that it is to be done in a
reasonable time.
